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CONCLUSION 
THE PLAINTIFF FULLY PERFORMED ITS 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE 
PLAINTIFF rs THEREFORE ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ITS FEE FOR ITS SERVICES. 
THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT AVOID THEIR 
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I\ T~E SUPRE\!E COURT OF THE SLUE OF UL\H 
"':ILLIA'·I G. \' . .'\\DEVER & co:JPA\Y 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
JERRY B. BLACK, DDS; 0. BRE\T 
BUCK, DDS; RA'.\DY R. BL\CK, DDS; 
and ROBERT H. ~. KILLPACK, DDS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLAXT'S BRIEF 
Case ;..;o, 17603 
STATD!E;..;T OF THE :\ . .'\TURE OF C..'\SE 
This is a contract action wherein the plaintiff and 
appellant sought to recover its fee for services rendered 
pursuant to a written contract. The defendants and res-
pendents brought a Counterclaim against the plaintiff for 
recovery of a good faith deposit paid pursuant to the contract. 
DISPOSITIO~ I~ THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried without a jury to the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, District Judge of the Third Judicial District, 
on the Complaint of the plaintiff and the Answer and Counter-
claim of the defendants. The court heard testimony of the 
parties and various other witnesses and received a Memorandum 
filed by the plaintiff. The court entered a Judgment of no 
cause of action in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Complaint. Further, the court entered a Judgment in favor 
of the defendants on the defendants' Counterclaim. The 
plaintiff filed a Notion for New Trial and a Notion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and 
filed a Memorandum in Support Thereof. Following oral 
argument, the court denied the plaintiff's Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the Judgment reversed as 
to the dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint and the award 
of damages, interest and costs on the defendants' Counter-
claim. In the event the plaintiff is not found entitled to 
a reversal of the dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint, 
the plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Judgment in favor of 
the defendants on the Counterclaim. In the alternative, the 
plaintiff seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, William G. Vandever & Company, is a 
corporation engaged in the business of locating and negotia-
ting commercial financing. The defendants are four dentists 
who entered into an arrangement to develop a medical office 
complex in Salt Lake City. (Tr 13) 
The plaintiff and the defendants are the parties to a 
written agreement known as an "Authorization to Obtain 
Financing." (Exhibit 3P, Tr 18) Pursuant to this Authorization 
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to Obtain Financing, the plaintiff was emoloyed to make appli-
cations on behalf of the defendants for financing a doctors' 
office complex. (Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3P) As consideration 
for the plaintiff's services in negotiating the financing, the 
plaintiff was to receive 4 percent of the total amount of any 
loan commitment payable at the time of issuance of the commit-
ment. (Paragraph 7 of Exhibit 3P) The Authorization, as 
pertinent to this appeal, was for financing " ... for such other 
amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the parties." 
(Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 3P) 
The defendants, prior to employing the plaintiff, had 
attempted unsuccessfully to obtain financing on their own. 
(Tr 14) At the initial meeting between the plaintiff and the 
defendant's spokesman, Dr. Jerry Black, the plaintiff delivered 
a checklist of items required for the preparation of a loan 
package. Among other things, this checklist required that an 
appraisal or feasibility study be provided by the defendants. 
This checklist also noted the possibility that a loan commitment 
would be issued subject to an appraisal if the appraisal was not 
provided. (Paragraph 17 of Exhibit 2P) 
A tentative commitment from American United Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as the "Insurance 
Company") for $375,000 in financing at 10~% interest of a 20-year 
term and a 25-year amortization was obtained by the plaintiff on 
behalf of the defendants. (Tr 20 and Exhibits SP and 6P) 
-3-
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The defendants accepted the tentative commitment. 
(Tr 21 and Exhibit 7P) The defendants also sent deposits to 
the Insurance Company as part of the good faith deposit. (Tr 21 
and Exhibit SP) The letter of acceptance requested urgent 
attention to the financing sought by the defendants. (Exhibit 7P) 
The Insurance Company issued a loan commitment dated 
January 16, 1979, to the defendants. (Tr 22 and Exhibit 9P) 
This commitment was a standard real estate loan commitment and 
included the terms which had been accepted by the defendants. 
As had been set forth in the checklist of information, the 
loan amount was limited to "an amount not exceeding 75% of the 
appraised value of the property as reflected by the appraisal 
herein required." (Exhibit 9P) 
Following receipt of the loan commitment, appraisers 
were contacted by the defendants with regard to completing the 
appraisal. The credentials of Mr. Raymond Fletcher, the 
appraiser selected by the defendants, were submitted to and 
approved by the Insurance Company. (Tr 25 and Exhibit llP) 
Nothing had prevented the defendants from obtaining the appraisal 
prior to receipt of the commitment. (Tr 54 and 55) 
One of the defendants, Robert H. M. Killpack, was not 
in the country. (Tr 60) Mr. Boyd Jensen acted on behalf of Dr. 
Killpack. (Tr 60) Mr. Jensen signed, on behalf of Dr. Killpack, 
the Authorization to Obtain Financing and the commitment from 
Insurance Company. (Tr 62 and Exhibit 9P) 
- 4-
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Jensen signed the Authorization knowing the maximum 
amount requested was $397,000. (Tr 66) The commitment was 
apparently signed contingent on Dr. Killpack's agreement with 
the transaction. Killpack had informed Jensen that 100% finan-
cing of the project was required. (Tr 66) When Jensen contacted 
Killpack, he informed Killpack that there was no guarantee that 
the financing was to be 100%. Upon Jensen's representations 
that 100% financing was not guaranteed, the proposal was 
rejected. (Tr 66) 
Upon receipt of the commitment of the Insurance Company, 
the plaintiff took steps with regard to obtaining construction 
financing for the defendants. (Tr 81-32) The efforts regarding 
construction financing were stopped when Mr. H. P. Merritt, 
the Regional Vice-President for the plaintiff, was informed 
by Dr. Black that the defendants would not go through with the 
loan commitment. (Tr 82) 
On February 22, 1979, the Authorization to Obtain 
Financing was cancelled effective 10 days thereafter. (Tr22-23 
and Exhibit 12P) The defendants paid only $3,000 of the total 
$15,000 fee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF FULLY PERFORMED ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS FEE 
FOR ITS SERVICES. 
The "Authorization to Obtain Financing" obligated the 
plaintiff to make applications for financing on behalf of the 
- 5 -
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defendant. (Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3P) As nertinent to this 
action, the defendants authori:ed the nlaintiff to make apnlication 
for financing " .for such other amounts and/or terms as mav 
be acceptable to the narties." (Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 3P) 
The plaintiff was to be compensated for its services in negotiating 
the financing. The comnensation was due at the time the loan 
commitment was issued to the defendants. (Paragraph 7 of Exhibit 
3P) 
The plaintiff fully nerformed its contractual commit-
ment by delivering the tentative bid of the Insurance Company 
which was accepted by the defendants and for which the defendants 
paid a 1% good faith deposit and by subsequentlv delivering 
the final commitment of the Insurance Company and bv remaining 
willing to· conduct further negotiations for the defendants. 
The defendants by not reaching agreement among themselves or bv 
subjectively disagreeing with the commitment cannot avoid their 
contractual obligations. These "defenses" are discussed through-
out the remainder of this Brief. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT AVOID THEIR OBLIGATION TO THE 
PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THEY DID NOT UTILIZE THE FINANCING 
OF THE INSURANCE COMPA>JY. 
The law does not require that a binding contract actuallv 
be entered into as a condition to recovery of a fee for services. 
It is immaterial whether the defendants actually entered into 
an agreement with the Insurance Comnany. 
- 6 -
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In Curtis v. 11ortensen, 1 Utah2d 35.\, 267 P2d 237 (1954), 
the plaintiff brokers had a listing agreement with the defendant 
entitling the plaintiffs to a commission unon oroviding a "ready, 
willing and able buyer." An "earnest money agreement" was 
entered into by the defendant-seller and orosoective buyers. 
The "earnest money agreement" was subject to the apnroval of the 
buyers and contained other conditions. Unon learning that the 
"earnest money agreement" was conditional and pursuant to advice 
of counsel, the defendant-seller rescinded the agreement. The 
buyers brought an action for specific performance. The court 
denied specific performance because there had been no considera-
tion paid and because the defendant-seller rescinded the agreement 
before it was approved by the buyers. This court held that it 
was immaterial whether the purchasers could enforce the "earnest 
money agreement.'' The auestion was whether the brokers had 
performed their contractual obligations by finding "ready, 
willing and able buyers." The court stated: 
.under such circumstances aonellants have 
fulfilled their part of the listing agreement by 
having produced purchasers that were ready, willing 
and able to buy the listed nronertv and are 
entitled to their commissions. Such were the terms 
of the listing agreement made by the parties. 
There is no requirement that a binding contract 
be entered into and for us to add that requirement 
would be to make a new contract for them. This 
we mav not do. As stated in AmJur, Sec. 184, 
o. 1097: 'Once the broker has nrocured a person ~ho is able, ready and willing to Purchase on the 
terms offered by the owner, he is entitled to 
commissions, even though the failure to complete 
the contract is due to the default or refusal of 
the employer.' 267 P2d at 239. 
In Curtis, this court cited with aporoval Little and 
Little v. Fleishman as follows: 
- 7 -
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The substantial features of the agreement between 
plaintiffs and the defendant are that the plaintiffs 
were employed to effect, not consumate, a sale, and 
were entitled to a commission in the event of a sale 
at any price agreed upon. When the plaintiff obtained 
and procured a purchaser who was able, ready and 
willing to purchase for the price, and on the terms 
proposed, they did all that was required fo them, 
and the owner could not, under the terms of his 
contract with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell and 
decline to enter into negotiations of the sale with 
the proposed purchaser without becoming liable to 
plaintiffs for their commission. 
In the present case, the plaintiff was to be comPensated for its 
services in negotiating financing for the defendants. The Plaintiff'' 
fee was earned upon the issuance of financing or a loan commitment 
by the lending institution in accordance with the terms of Para-
graph 2 of the Authorization to Obtain Financing. This Paragranh 
required that the terms be acceptable to the Parties. 
None of the terms of the Authorization to Obtain Financing 
required that the defendants enter into a binding agreement with 
any lender. The plaintiff fulfilled its obligations by delivering 
the loan commitment. As in Curtis, the Plaintiff was entitled 
to recover its fee for its services. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS MUST HAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO COMPLETE 
THE TRANSACTION WITH THE INSURANCE COMPANY. IF THIS 
EFFORT IS NOT MADE, THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ITS FEE FOR ITS SERVICES. 
In Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 261 P2d 927 (Utah 1053), the 
plaintiffs entered into a brokerage agreement whereby the defendant 
broker was to receive a commission for its services. The commission 
-8-
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agreement provided that the commission was payable if the sale 
was consummated. An "earnest money agreement" was entered into, 
the terms and conditions of which were subject to adjustment 
agreeable to both parties. The parties did not agree on two 
conditions. The parties rescinded the agreement and sued the 
real estate broker to recover their advance fee. The broker 
counterclaimed to recover the remainder of the fee due based 
on the commission which would have been required had a sale been 
consummated. The court found the brokers were entitled to recover 
their commission notwithstanding that a transaction had not been 
consummated. The court stated: 
.under such circumstances Hoyt could not, by 
refusal to cooperate, defeat the defendant's right 
to its commission. And we say this advisedly, not-
withstanding the finding of the trial court, that 
when Hoyt originally engaged the defendat to sell 
the property, it was agreed that the commission 
would be paid .only if the sale were consummated. 
That agreement certainly contemplated that the 
plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward the 
accomplishment of the purpose for which he employed 
defendant. He cannot be permitted to Procure them 
to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted by the plain-
tiff, and then prevent the accomplishment of what 
he requested and authorized them to do by arbi-
trarily refusing to perform his nart of the trans-
action. Under such circumstances, he will not be 
heard to complain of their failure to do that which 
he prevented~ 261 P2d at 930. 
In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P2d 857 (Utah 1979), the plaintiff 
and the defendant had entered into an oral contract of ourchase 
regarding certain real property. The defendant was to oay the 
plaintiff a certain amount plus a fair commission. The plaintiff 
-9-
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refused to cooperate in discussing the commission issue. This 
court, in finding the contract enforceable, stated: 
.but to be considered therewith is the further 
proposition that the parties to a contract are 
obliged to nroceed in good faith to coonerate in 
performing the contract in accordance with its 
exnressed intent. Quite beyond this, one 
party to a contract cannot bv willful act or omission 
make it impossible or difficult for the other to 
perform and then invoke the other's nonperformance 
as a defense. 595 PZd at 859. 
In the present situation, the defendants are in substan-
tially the same position as the plaintiffs in~ and Ferris. 
Assuming arguendo, that the commitment of the Insurance Comnany 
was not acceptable to the defendants, this non-acceutabilitv 
results from the defendants' failure to comply with the apnraisal 
condition of the Authorization to Obtain Financing. If other 
portions of the commitment were unclear to the defendants, the 
defendants failed to take any stens to clarify the commitment or 
to determine precisely what a loan commitnent for a commercial 
real estate project consisted of. The defendants engaged the 
plaintiff to obtain a lender for them. They cannot avoid their 
obligation to the plaintiff by arbitratily refusing to coonerate 
of by making it difficult or impossible for the nlaintiff to perforn. 
POINT IV. 
THE COMMITMENT SECURED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFENDANTS 
WAS "ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES." "ACCEPTABLE" IS DEFI>IED 
BY THE USUAL BUSINESS MEANING OF THE WORD AS APPLIED TO 
THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS DEALINGS. 
In Commercial Credit Companv v. Insular Motor Cornoration, 
17 F2d 896 (1st Cir 1927), the plaintiff entered into an agreement 
-10-
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with the defendant wherebv the nlaintiff agreed to nurchase ''accept-
able retail time-sales obligations". The defendant argued that the 
contract lacked mutuality because a subjective internretation of the 
term "acceptable" aoplied. The court rejected this argument, 
stating: 
Plaintiff's agreement to purchase acceotable time-
sales obligations of the customers of the contract 
dealers is to be given its normal business meaning, 
bearing in mind that the olaintiff would have a · 
natural business motive to find all such obliga-
tions acceptable, if reasonably sound and fit to 
be handled by such a financing concern. 'Accent-
able' does not mean accentable bv whim; it means 
acceotable within the usual business meaning of 
the word as aoolied to this kind of business 
dealings. Failure or arbitrary refusal by the 
pla1nt1ff to furnish the banking credit reasonably 
contemnlated bv the contract would nlainlv have 
been a.breach of a legal dutv, grounding a valid 
claim for damages by anv dealer this injured. 
(Emohasis added.) 17 F2d 899-900. 
A loan commitment is a commonly utilized agreement in 
the real estate financing. A loan commitment contains certain 
terms based on the project, the financial considerations, and the 
nature of the loan transaction. 
Osborne, Nelson and Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, 
West Publishing Co. (1979) explains what a loan commitment as 
utilized in real estate financing is as follows: 
The permanent loan commitment, a promise by a 
lender to make a long-term loan on the nroperty 
when construction is completed, is of critical 
importance ... as a result of regulatory require-
ments, internal policies, or both, the great majority 
of construction lenders will not issue their commit-
ment until a permanent or 'take out' loan commit-
ment has been first obtained. 
The oermanent loan commitment will usually be 
based on the same underwriting considerations as 
the construction line loan: the borrower's credit 
-11-
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the project's design and technical feasibilitv, 
an appraisal of its cornoleted value and market-
ability, and the satisfaction of various title 
and other legal requirements. 
Loan commitments are usually hedged with numerous 
conditions to orotect the lender's interests. 
Other common conditions include submission to 
the lender of final plans and snecifications (if 
the commitment is issued on the basis of prelimi-
nary versions or if the lender has required 
changes) and submission of other documentation, 
including the executed construction contract, the 
documents creating the develoner entity (if a 
corporation, partnership or trust), leases executed 
by the major tenants, the title insurance report 
and binder, the nermanent loan commitment if a 
construction loan is being made, the building 
permit, and nerhaps an oninion of counsel resnect-
ing the vali~itv of the ~evelopers entity's 
creation, its power to undertake the oroject, and 
validity of the other documents. 
In a permanent loan commitment on a nroject to 
be built, lien-free completion in ac~ordance with 
the agreed plans and soecifications will be made 
a condition. 
The permanent commitment on a rental nroject, such 
as an apartment building or office building, may 
also be conditioned upon some snecified fraction 
of the nroject being rented. M~re complex 
arrangements are sometimes used, so that a nartion 
of the permanent loan will be funded at a given 
rental level ('floor'), and the remainder on a 
higher rental level ('ceiling') has been achieved. 
Real Estate Finance Law, Section 12.3, on. 721-723. 
The usual business meaning for a loan commitment for 
commercial real estate financing includes the terms exnlained above 
which were the terms of the Insurance Comnany's commitment. The 
Authorization to Obtain Financing obligated the nlaintiff to 
deliver such a loan commitment. The commitment delivered was 
precisely that required by the contract. Therefore, the nlaintiff 
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met its obligations under the contract. The plaintiff delivered a 
loan commitment which was accentable to the parties. 
POINT V. 
WHE:J PERFORHA>JCE OF A CONTRACT INVOLVES SATISFACTION 
OF ONE PARTY, AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF SATISFACTION 
APPLIES. 
In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah2d 66, 328 P2d 307 (1958), the 
plaintiff-contractor constructed a house for the defendants pursuant 
to a contract which required "satisfactory completion." The defendants 
asserted that they were not satisfied with the construction and 
that certain items on a list had not been completed. The court 
distinguished the cases where the undertaking is to do something 
pleasing to the personal taste, fancy or sensibility of the other 
party from a second classification of cases where operative fit-
ness, etc. is involved. An objective standard is aonlied to this 
second classification of cases. This court stated: 
The other classifications involve satisfaction as 
to such things as operative fitness, mechanical 
utility or structural comnleteness in which the 
personal sensibilities ju~t mentioned would not 
reasonably be deemed of such predominant import-
ance to the nerformance. As to such contracts, 
rhe better c~nsidered view, and the one we adhere 
to, is that an objective standard should be 
applied: that is, that the narty favored by such 
a provision has no arbitrarv nrivilege of 
declining to acknowledge satisfaction and that he 
cannot withhold aoproval unless there is apparent 
some reasonable justification for doing so. 
328 PZd at 309. 
In W. P. Harland Construction Comoanv v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 19 Utal12d 364, 431 P2d 972 (1967), the plaintiff claimed 
that the defendant had refused to anprove the use of certain 
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equipment in a highway construction nroject. There was no conten-
tion that the defendant had agreed to the use of the equinment, 
but rather that the defendant had refused to allow its use without 
reason or justification. The court stated the obligation of the 
defendant as follows: 
.However, it is to be conceded that where a 
contract orovides that a matter of acoroval or 
satisfaction of a method of oneration, or ner-
formance of a contract, is reserved to a carty, 
it is to be assumed that he will act fairly and 
in good faith. It is generally held the he can-
not without any reason or excuse, arbitrarily 
withhold aooroval, or acknowledgement of satis-
faction. 431 P2d at 793. 
In Harland, because the defendant's structural engineer 
had given considerable attention and consideration to the nronosed 
equipment, was familiar with other tests of the equioment and had 
personally observed the ooeration of alternative equinment, the 
court found the defendqnt had not acted arbitrarilv. However, in 
the present case, the defendants determined that there were several 
terms of the loan commitment which were nersonally unaccentable 
to them. The defendant had not and did not contact anv financial 
institutions or legal counsel (excent for Mr. Jensen, who is an 
attorney) with regard to the loan commitment (as required bv ~ 
They took no steps to determine whether the loan commitment was 
objectively satisfactory and accentable. 
POINT VI. 
THE DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO 
CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS OR SEEK OTHER FINANCING WAS 
A REPUDIATION TO OBTAIN FINANCING. 
Assuming arguendo, that the commitment secured for the 
defendants was not accentable to the carties, that the comnletion of 
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the anpraisal was not the defendants' obligation under the 
Authorization to Obtain Financing, and that the defendants did not 
arbitrarily refuse to enter into the agreement, the defendants 
still had an obligation to allow the plaintiff to continue to 
perform its obligations under the Authorization to Obtain Finan-
cing. The Authorization to Obtain Financing was not effectively 
cancelled until apnroximately March 1, 1979. This cancellation 
came by reason of the letter of the defendants' legal counsel, 
who recognized that the contract remained in force until that 
date. 
On or about February 7, 1979, the defendants refused to 
provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to continue negotiations 
with the Insurance Companv or other prosnective lenders. They 
further refused to disclose the concerns they had for the loan 
commitment. The plaintiff remained willing until ~he defendants 
refused to continue to assist the defendants with their search 
for financing. 
In C.R.I. v. Watson, 608 FZd 1137 (8th Circuit 1979), 
the owner of a shopping center entered into an agreement whereby 
the plaintiff had the exclusive right to find a corporate 
buyer of a portion of the shonning center. The agreement was 
subject to certain other agreements being delivered to and 
accepted by the defendant. 
The defendant notified the plaintiff he wasn't going to 
go through with the contract. This renudiation made the plaintiff's 
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performance impossible eMen though the nlaintiff remained readv, 
able and willing to nerform. In finding the broker entitled to 
recover the commission which it would have received had it oro-
duced a buyer, the court stated: 
Watson, (defendant) also challenged the court's 
finding that, 'bv refusing to nerform in accord-
ance with the terms of the Sentember 18 contract, 
Watson made it imnossible for C.R.I. to nroduce 
a buyer as required. C.R.I., at all times, stood 
ready, willing and able to nroduce a buver, but 
was prevented from doing so only by Watson's re-
pudiation of the agreement.' Watson's actual argu-
ments do not refute the finding that there was 
'reasonable likelihood of (C.R.I. 's)(nlaintiff's) 
ability to produce a buyer,' or that 0atson's breach 
prevented C.R.I. from performing. 
The court not only found C.R.I. had made substantial efforts and 
had unto at least two notential nurchasers, but also that C.R.I. 
was prepared to purchase. 608 FZd at 114~. 
In C.R.I., the broker was allowed to recover its commiss 
when a repudiation took place before the broker had oerformed or 
found any potential buyers. In the present case, the nlaintiff 
had already found at least one ootential lender nrior to the 
repudiation of the defendants. Therefore, the nlaintiff is 
entitled to recover its fee. The defendants cannot avoid their 
contractual duties by repudiating the agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The nlaintiff was entitled to recover a fee for its 
services in negotiating financing for the defendants. The olaintif 
became en ti tied to this fee upon de Ii verv of a loan commitment. Thi 
plaintiff delivered a tentative and final loan commitment. The 
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final loan commitment, on an objective basis, was nrecisely 
the commitment contemplated by the narties' contract and was 
acceptable to the oarties. 
The defendants cannot avoid their obligation to comPen-
sate the plaintiff for its services by failing to have an appraisal 
completed, by refusing to coonerate or making Performance difficult 
or impossible, by failing to agree among themselves, or by 
repudiating the agreement. The defendants should be required to 
compensate the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff resnectfully submits that the District 
Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Comnlaint should be reversed, 
and judgment for the Plaintiff in the amount of $12,000.00 should 
be entered. Should the olaintiff not be found entitled to a 
reversal, the Plaintiff submits that the judgment on the defen-
dants' Counterclaim should be reversed. In the alternative, the 
plaintiff submits that a new trial should be granted. 
DATED this :3J day of August, 1981. 
-~---
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
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